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Another look at the distribution of direct payments: 
The link with part-time farming 
 
Abstract 
This paper contributes to the research about the relationship between off-farm employment and 
public support, by taking the issue upside down: does off-farm employment give an advantage to 
farms regarding the level of public support? Our hypothesis is that a higher degree of decoupling 
enables part-time farms to capture more easily direct payments than full-time farms. To test this, 
we compare the largely decoupled direct payment system in Switzerland in 2004, and the rather 
production-oriented payment system in France in 2003. Results show that Switzerland’s policy 
favoured farmers with an off-farm employment, while the French direct payment system had the 
opposite effect. 
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Un autre regard sur la distribution du soutien : 
Le lien avec la pluriactivité 
 
Résumé 
Cet  article  contribue  aux  recherches  existantes  sur  la  relation  entre  la  pluriactivité  des 
exploitations agricoles et le soutien public, en considérant la question à l’envers : la pluriactivité 
permet-elle aux exploitants de capter le soutien public ? Notre hypothèse est qu’un degré de 
découplage plus important permet aux exploitations pluriactives de capter plus facilement les 
aides  directes  que  cela  ne  le  permet  aux  exploitations  à  plein  temps.  Pour  la  tester,  nous 
comparons le système d’aides directes largement découplées en Suisse en 2004 et le système 
d’aides plus orienté sur la production en France en 2003. Les résultats montrent que la politique 
suisse favorise les exploitants pluriactifs, alors que les aides directes en France ont l’effet opposé. 
 
Mots-clefs : aides directes, distribution, pluriactivité, Suisse, France 
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Another look at the distribution of direct payments: 
The link with part-time farming 
 
1.  Introduction 
Since governments support the farming sectors, the question about the distribution of this support 
bothers agricultural economists (Blandford, 1987; Jones, 1994). After market support has become 
increasingly sidelined by coupled and decoupled direct payments, this question has become even 
more relevant. Some researchers have focused on the redistributive effects of public support, i.e. 
whether subsidies can equalize incomes across farms (e.g. Allanson, 2006; Schmid et al., 2006). 
Other studies are concerned with the first step of identifying which farms receive most of the 
support. For example, Chatellier et al. (2007, Table 5) calculated that in France direct payments 
accounted for 87 per cent of the family farm income for all professional farms on average for 
2001-2005, and that the main beneficiaries in terms of specialization were oil- and protein-seeds 
farms (183 per cent) and beef farms (148 per cent) and that the smallest beneficiaries in terms of 
size were farms above 100 European Size Units (1 European Size Unit is equivalent to 2,000 
euros of Standard Gross Margin) (74 per cent). The authors also claimed that the dependence of 
farm incomes on direct payments in France would increase in the next years. 
Studies  on  support  distribution  have  not  been  concerned,  however,  about  the  part-time 
characteristic of farms. There is a trend of research that has investigated how public subsidies 
influence off-farm labor. For example, some papers have shown that farm households’ off-farm 
labor supply decreases when the farm income part that is certain, such as government support, 
increases (e.g. Ahearn et al., 2006; Kwon et al., 2006). It can be expected that, with an increased 
degree of decoupling, farmers would increase their off-farm participation, but this has not been 
proved for certain in the United States (Ahearn et al., 2006) or in France (Butault et al., 2005; 
Douarin et al., 2007). Serra et al. (2005) even found weak evidence for the opposite, namely that 
fixed, decoupled payments may have reduced the likelihood of off-farm labor participation from 
Kansas. 
However, the reverse link between off-farm labor and subsidies has, to our knowledge, never 
been considered. The common view is that part-time farms, being not fully involved in farming, 
receive fewer subsidies than full-time farms. For example, Laurent et al. (2002) came to this Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-02 
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conclusion after studying the agricultural policy laws for five countries in the European Union 
(EU). Although such view might be true in absolute value or relative to total farm income, it is 
not so sure when considering subsidies per farm labor unit. This paper contributes to the research 
concerned with the relationship between off-farm employment and public support, by taking the 
issue upside down: does off-farm employment give an advantage to farms regarding the level of 
public support? 
We expect that the answer to this question depends on the type of support considered, and our 
hypothesis is that more decoupled payments, because they provide incentives to extensify, are 
more easily captured by part-time farms. To test this proposition, we do not use the approach of 
comparing several hypothetical scenarios in the same group of farmers (which requires using 
modeling or intention surveys), as it is done usually (e.g. Colson et al., 1998; Breen et al., 2005; 
Douarin et al., 2007). Instead, we adopt the original approach of comparing two existing policies 
in  different  countries:  the  largely  decoupled  direct  payment  system  in  Switzerland  where, 
according  to  our  hypothesis,  part-time  farmers  are  rewarded  by  the  system,  and  the  rather 
production-oriented  payment  system  in  France,  where  we  suspect  a  disincentive  for  off-farm 
work. This, we believe is particularly true for the period considered (2004 for Switzerland, 2003 
for  France),  before  the  latest  reform  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  (the  2003 
Luxemburg reform) applied in 2006 in France. 
In the next section, we argue that the Swiss direct payment system is one of the most decoupled 
systems, whereas, by contrast, the French government is one of the most ardent supporters of 
coupling  within  the  framework provided  by  the EU.  A  brief  attempt is made to  explain  the 
different  political  strategies.  In  the  following  section,  we  argue  why  coupling  provides  a 
disincentive for off-farm occupations, and draw our hypothesis. The method how to test this 
hypothesis and the data used are presented in the next section. The following section provides 
evidence  showing  how  the  Swiss  direct  payment  system  favors  part-time  farmers,  while  the 
French system does the opposite. The last section concludes. 
 
2.  A tale of two direct payment systems 
Switzerland  as  one  of  the  few  non-EU-member  states  in  Western  Europe  follows  an  own 
Agricultural Policy which is largely based on direct payments. It was not until the people evinced Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-02 
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their  will  for  a  change  in  the  agricultural  policy  paradigm  by  a  referendum  in  1996  that 
interventions in agricultural product markets by tariffs, product allowances and export subsidies 
were displaced as the most important policy instrument. Ever since, 2.3 billion Swiss francs out 
of the 3 billion Swiss francs federal budget for agricultural policy have gone into two categories 
of direct payments. It rests firmly on the principle of cross-compliance (Curry and Stucki, 1997; 
Mann, 2005). Direct payments are grouped into General Direct Payments and Ecological Direct 
Payments. The General Direct Payments are also tied to ecological restrictions which are met by 
more  than  60,000  out  of  Switzerland’s  70,000  farms.  The  so-called  “proof  of  ecological 
performance (PEP)” which farmers have to furnish in order to qualify for direct payments has led 
to a halving of mineral fertilizer applications compared with Germany over five  years. Crop 
rotation restrictions and the need to extensify 7 per cent of the farmland are also unique to Swiss 
agriculture.  Ecological  Direct  Payments  are  linked  to  agri-environmental  programs  like 
restrictions on fertilization and pesticide application and to ethological  farm programs where 
farmers  are  paid  for  particularly  animal-friendly  housing  systems  and  for  keeping  animals 
outdoors. Regarding the General Direct Payments that are based on the number of hectares and 
ruminants,  an  evaluation  has  tested  the  responsiveness  of  production  to  direct  payments  by 
applying an optimization model (Mann and Mack, 2004). While the payments for ruminants were 
shown to somehow influence the production of meat and milk, the payments based on land had 
hardly any impact on the amounts produced by Swiss farmers. 
In WTO negotiations, not only Ecological Direct Payments, but also General Direct Payments of 
the Swiss system made it into the Green Box. This seems justified with regard to the cited model 
calculations. The level of decoupling of Swiss direct payments seems to be relatively high. By 
contrast, it is not rare to find much more critical words on the level of decoupling in Europe’s 
CAP, such as those by Watkins and von Braun (2003, p. 11) as regards the 2003 CAP reform: 
“At  the  end  of  the  process  of  member-state  wrangling,  decoupling  has  been  only  partially 
introduced in cereals, but countries can delay this until 2007. Sectors such as sugar and dairy that 
account for the bulk of export subsidies are either untouched or subject to only modest reforms.” 
Desjeux et al. (2007) explain this for France by the strong farmers’ lobbies, by the late arrival of 
ecologists on the decision sphere, and by the continuous ardor of France’s government to ensure 
high returns from the European budget to the French agriculture.  
France  was  indeed  the  most  exposed  opponent  of  decoupling  within  the  EU  (Cunha,  2004). Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-02 
 
  7 
Based mainly on the argument that a high degree of decoupling would lead to land abandonment 
in sensitive regions, French governments have always tried to keep payments to farms as much 
coupled as possible under the CAP schemes. The most recent example regards the 2003 CAP 
reform. The objective of this reform was to give more market-oriented incentives to European 
farmers, in order to limit over-production and to reduce the EU budget devoted to agriculture. 
However, using the most of the flexibility given to Member-States, France chose to apply the 
minimum degree of decoupling to the payments (e.g. 25 per cent of the direct payment to arable 
land is still tied to the specific crops) and to implement the reform not in the first possible year of 
application  (it  was  applied  in  2006).  During  the  period  of  interest  in  this  paper,  2003,  the 
agriculture of France was under the CAP regime of the Agenda 2000. Within this frame, despite a 
reduction in the level of intervention compared to the previous CAP regime, farmers were still 
receiving  guaranteed  prices  for  cereals,  oil-  and  protein-seed  crops  and  for  beef,  and  a  new 
livestock premium, based on the number of slaughtered heads (Guyomard and Le Bris, 2003). 
This reveals a very different strategy between the Swiss and the French government. While the 
French  government  considers  direct  payments  as  a  tool  for  competitiveness  on  agricultural 
markets, the Swiss government stresses the multifunctionality of agriculture (Wiggering et al., 
2003; Mann and Wüstemann, 2008), whereby farmers provide a number of positive non-market 
goods in exchange for payments. 
 
3.  Expectations and hypothesis 
The term “coupling” implies that the level of direct payments which a farm receives is positively 
correlated with the production of food and feed on the farm. The term “decoupling”, however, is 
only defined in a negative sense. While it shows the intention to leave the physical farm output as 
a reference, it does not make clear what takes its place. In fact, one could argue that decoupling 
as a term is misleading, because every payment must be coupled on something. Regarding the 
CAP in particular, “decoupling” has intensified the link (or “coupling”) both between the land of 
the farm and the level of payments, and the farm as a unit itself and the level of payments. In a 
process that is thus wrongly termed as “decoupling”, the Swiss government has used a different 
way for quantifying the level of direct payments. As explained in the previous section, many non-
market goods are now paid for by the government. The farmer can now decide to which extent Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-02 
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he/she wishes to earn his/her money through food production, via the market, and to which extent 
he/she provides non-market goods like biodiversity, beautiful landscapes and clean  water  for 
which he/she is reimbursed by the government. 
Public goods provided by agriculture are rarely labor-intensive. Extensively used grassland, for 
example, provides the best base for biodiversity and uses very little labor on the asset of land. 
Set-aside arable land can be most valuable for the undisturbed development of flora and fauna, 
but, again, the ratio between the necessary labor and invested capital (mainly farmland) is low. 
Ellis et al. (1999) have for example showed that the biodiversity of grassland on part-time farms 
tends to be higher than that on full-time farms. 
However, the opportunity costs for labor differ between full-time and part-time farmers (Schmitt, 
1988; 1989). For full-time farmers, the opportunity costs can be assumed as zero. For part-time 
farmers, however,  opportunity  costs  will  equal  the wage  rate for  their  off-farm  employment. 
While labor costs differ between full-time and part-time farms, capital costs will be equal, given 
that banks do rarely care about off-farm occupations of their agricultural clients. This difference 
implies that the profit-maximizing ratio between capital and labor will be higher for part-time 
farms than for full-time farms. This is for example true for Swiss farms (Mann and Latruffe, 
2007), while the general intensity has been repeatedly shown to be lower for part-time farmers in 
Scotland (Phimister and Roberts, 2002; 2006).  
In summary of the above discussion, we make the three following causal propositions. Firstly, so-
called decoupling measures favor the provision of public goods compared to “coupled” support 
systems.  Secondly,  the  provision  of  public  goods  requires  relatively  more  capital  than  labor 
compared to food production. Thirdly, part-time farms, with their relatively high opportunity 
costs will specialize on capital-intensive activities. Based on these three propositions, we draw 
our hypothesis that decoupled support systems, like the Swiss one, favors part-time farmers, 
whereas coupled payment systems, like the one in the EU and especially in France before the 
latest  CAP  reform  implementation,  favors  full-time  farmers,  albeit  none  of  the  two  systems 
explicitly take off-farm work into account. In other words, a higher degree of decoupling gives an 
advantage to part-time farms in terms of public direct payments over full-time farms. 
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4.  Data and method 
To test the above hypothesis, farm-level data were used, of 2003 for France and of 2004 for 
Switzerland. These were years where support in France was still strongly coupled to production 
activities, whereas the decoupled system of Switzerland was already in place, as explained above. 
Data  were  extracted  from  the  Farm  Accountancy  Data  Network  (FADN)  database  in  each 
country.  For  France,  however,  information  about  off-farm  incomes  is  not  part  of the  FADN 
system as in many EU countries. Therefore, for this country, data from the tax records were used 
and linked with the FADN data set. This matching process is carried out by the Ministry of 
Agriculture in collaboration with the Statistical Office (INSEE) and has been done only three 
times since its first implementation in 1991. In order to account for potential income variability, 
the  agricultural  income  that  is  compared  to  the  non-agricultural  income  declared  in  the  tax 
register at year t, is an average of agricultural incomes over the three consecutive years preceding 
the year t (Chatellier et al., 2007). 
The  Swiss  sample  is  composed  of  2,513  farms  in  the  2004  national  FADN,  whose  utilized 
agricultural area (UAA) is 19 hectares and labor use is 1.6 annual working units (AWU; one 
AWU is equivalent to 2,200 worked hours) on average. The French sample used consists of 6,941 
farms, for which information about non-agricultural income is available and reliable, out of the 
7,314 farms included in the 2003  French  FADN data set. The sample’s average UAA is 90 
hectares and average labor use is 2.4 AWU, which is much larger than the Swiss sample but 
representative of the full French FADN data of this year. 
In  order  to  test  the  hypothesis  about  the  relationship  between  off-farm  employment  and  the 
different types of governmental support, direct payments per farm labor unit were used as a the 
dependent variable in a regression. Regarding the explanatory variables, as no data are available 
about the time spent off farm, the share of off-farm income in the total income was taken as a 
proxy for the part-time character of farms. We assumed that a larger share indicated a larger time 
spent off the farm. We used the share and its squared value, in order to investigate potential non-
linear effects. While this proxy would be sufficient to test the hypothesis developed above, other 
important  variables  had  to  be  included  to  avoid  the  prevalence  of  background  variables.  As 
Hennessy and Thorne (2005) have shown, the age of farmers may influence the level of direct 
payments. Younger farmers may be more able to adapt to a new support system and receive more Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-02 
 
  10 
transfer payments. The area where the farm is located may also play a role on the level of direct 
payments in both countries. Switzerland is divided into three production zones in accordance to 
their sea level. Hill farms receive more direct payments than lowland farms, but less so than 
mountain farms. In France, as in other EU Member States, specific CAP payments are handed out 
in disadvantaged areas labeled as Less Favored Areas (LFA). In both countries, a considerable 
share of direct payments uses land or animals as a reference. Since our dependent variable refers 
to direct payments per labor unit, we also need to use land and animals per labor unit as important 
predicting variables. Another variable of interest is the share of hired labor. In Switzerland, there 
is the traditional objective to support explicitly family farms. It can therefore be assumed that 
external labor would decrease the level of direct payments per farm worker. The farm system 
may play an important role, in particular in Switzerland. While most direct payments are subject 
to cross-compliance, i.e. to the application of integrated farming principles, the share of organic 
farms is around ten per cent, being relatively high even on European standards. Organic farmers 
enjoy additional support by the Swiss government, in opposite to French farmers who receive 
support only during the process of conversion to organic production. The potential endogeneity 
of several explanatory variables (part-time character; land per labor; livestock units per labor) 
was tested for and accounted for with the help of instrumental variables. 
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression. In 2004 Swiss 
farms benefited of slightly more public direct payments per farm labor unit than French farms did 
in 2003 (21,683 euros against 18,540 euros). The former relied to a much lesser extent on off-
farm income than the latter (18 per cent against 30 per cent in the total income). Head farmers 
were on average the same age in both countries (45.5 against 46 years). Intuitively there were 
relatively more Swiss farms in the mountainous areas (regional category 3) than French farms. 
The discrepancy in the ratios of land and animals per worker between both samples confirm the 
earlier description, namely that Swiss farms are much smaller than French farms (13.6 hectares 
and 13.6 livestock units per labor unit against 41.9 hectares and 103.1 livestock units per labor 
unit). However, both samples used on average a similar share of hired labor (18 per cent). As for 
the farming systems, they were more environmental-friendly (farm system categories 2 and 3) in 
Switzerland than in France. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used 










Direct payments  Euros / real labor unit  21,683  11,572  18,540  16,625 
Part-time 
character 
Off-farm income divided by total 
income 
0.18  0.48  0.30  0.30 
Farmer’s age  In years  45.5  9.2  46.0  8.8 
Region  1-valley, 2-hills, 3-mountains (CH); 
1-not in LFA, 2-LFA not 
mountains, 3-LFA mountains (F) 
1.81  0.82  1.51  0.72 
Land per worker  Hectares per real labor unit  13.6  7.6  52.0  41.9 
Animals per 
worker 
Livestock Units per real labor unit  13.6  8.0  44.2  103.1 
Hired labor to 
farm labor 
Labor units hired workers divided 
by total on-farm labor units 
0.18  0.20  0.18  0.26 
Farm system  1-conventional, 2- integrated (CH) 
or in the process of conversion to 
organic (F), 3-organic 
2.15  0.38  1.04  0.24 
F: France. CH: Switzerland. LFA: Less Favored Areas. 
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5.  Results 
The  regression  results  are  presented  in  table  2.  They are  for  a  two-stage  least  square model 
accounting for endogeneity. The model’s specification chosen is highly satisfactory, judging by 
the large R-square values. The regression coefficients for the variable part-time character and its 
square  value  are  significant  for  both  countries  but  present  different  signs  depending  on  the 
country. Such results primarily confirm our hypothesis. In Switzerland, a rising level of off-farm 
revenue leads to increasing direct payments per worker (positive estimated coefficient of the part-
time proxy). This effect,  however,  weakens  with  a  growing  off-farm  income  share  (negative 
estimated coefficient of the squared part-time proxy). In France, however, it is the opposite. The 
more the farmer works off farm, the less direct payments per labor unit he/she receives. Likewise, 
this effect fades the more the farmer participates to off-farm work. This illustrates the different 
effects of coupling and decoupling on the attractiveness of part-time farming. 
The other effects which the regressions reveal are less surprising and more uniform if compared 
between the two countries. Particularly in France, young farmers seem to be more skilled in 
maximizing  their  claim  for  direct  payments.  More  disadvantaged  regions  in  both  countries 
receive more  direct payments  per labor  unit than  other  regions. As  for  the ratio  of  land  per 
worker, it strongly positively influences the amount of direct payments which a farmer receives 
in Switzerland and in France. As expected, this reflects the fact that most of the payments were 
still tied to hectares in both countries. The same influence could be expected for the ratio of 
animals per worker, but the impact is positive in Switzerland only, while it is negative in France. 
This discrepancy may be due to the fact that the French sample includes a larger share of crop 
specialized farms than the Swiss sample. In France there is a dependency from the share of hired 
labor. French farms that rely a lot on external labor receive less direct payments per labor unit 
(negative significant coefficient for the ratio of hired labor to total farm labor). This may confirm 
our hypothesis that family farms receive particular support for cultural reasons. It may also be an 
indicator  for  higher  labor  intensity  of  the  farm  which  is  apparently  not  rewarded  by  direct 
payments. For Switzerland, one more factor determines the amount of direct payments received 
per labor unit on the farms. The more environmentally sound the farming system is, the more 
direct  payments  are  paid  (positive  significant  coefficient  for  the  farm  system  categories, 
representing  increasing  organic  character).  This  confirms  our  claim  that  direct  payments  in 
Switzerland are only decoupled from production, but not from the delivery of public goods. This Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-02 
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connection does not exist in France, probably due to the lack of support to organic farming per 
se. 
 
Table 2: Regression results (direct payments per labor unit as dependent variable) 
  Switzerland  France 
Number of observations  2,513  6,941 
Part-time character  8,870*** (5.92)  -4,026*** (-3.07) 
Part-time character squared  -3,873*** (-2.94)  4,177*** (3.69) 
Farmer’s age  -15 (-5.12)  -32*** (-2.90) 
Region  5,908*** (16.18)  777*** (5.99) 
Land per worker  1,949*** (9.65)  323*** (26.2) 
Animals per worker  591*** (2.88)  -18*** (-5.75) 
Hired labor to farm labor  -1362 (-0.77)  -2,458*** (-2.70) 
Farm system  5,689*** (11.45)  584 (1.59) 
Constant  -24,057*** (-7.40)  2,264* (-1.87) 
R-square  0.72  0.79 
Estimated coefficients in the table, with t-value in parentheses. *** means p<0.01; ** means p<0.05; * means 
p<0.10. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
The declaration by Mariann Fischer Boel on part-time farming in 2006 had caused uproar among Working Paper SMART – LERECO N° 09-02 
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French farmers. The European Commissioner for agriculture reckoned that farmers in Europe 
would  need  a  second  source  of  income,  besides  agriculture,  to  survive  in  the  next  decade 
(Bounds, 2006). The uproar that followed this quote is not surprising. The farming profession in 
France is one of the most traditionalists with regard to the role of agriculture, supporting food 
production against farming for the provision of public goods and hobby farming. For example, a 
study of farmers’ opinions in several EU countries in 2005 revealed that French respondents 
strongly agreed with the statement that farmers should not have to resort to off-farm work in 
order to keep up their farm (Gorton et al., 2008, Table 3). 
Part-time farming may however be a model to divert surplus labor and to enable extensive land 
management,  particularly  for  small-structured  farming  systems  prevailing  in  Europe.  Direct 
payment systems that mainly use the delivery of public goods as a reference do support such 
forms of labor regimes. In this paper we have shown that Switzerland is a case in point where 
cross-compliance and agri-environmental programs favor farmers with an off-farm employment. 
This favored status, however, does not increase proportionally with increasing occupation of farm 
family members outside agriculture. By contrast, direct payment systems that are still strongly 
coupled to agricultural production have the opposite effect. Within this system, part-time farms, 
having  other  obligations  but  to  produce  intensively,  are  disadvantaged  in  terms  of  public 
transfers.  This is the  case  in  France,  where  full  decoupling  has always  been  rejected  by  the 
national government. 
It is nonetheless clear that direct transfers to farms will, to a large part, more and more determine 
the scope of future farming. The more targeted payments to farmers are, the more society will be 
able to steer agriculture into the direction it intends. This applies particularly to the question 
whether direct payments should be coupled with production activities. Supporters of coupling 
stress the importance of a viable food production (Commission des Communautés Européennes, 
2006, p. 45), whereas economists are mostly in favor of decoupling which decreases welfare 
losses  through  misallocation  (Swinbank  and  Tangermann,  2004).  While  we  have  shown  that 
direct-payment systems with a high degree of decoupling can support labor-extensive part-time 
farming, future research might want to find out what possibilities the government has to steer 
rural labor markets outside agriculture in order to support the extensive use of farmland. 
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